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Abstract
Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory.
The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all
games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static)
or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative
games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a
non-cooperative Stackelberg game, they can be mapped to a Stackelberg
game. I.e., the game designer is the leader who is totally rational and hon-
est, and the followers are mapped to the players of the designed game. If
now the game designer, or “the leader” in the Stackelberg context, adopts
a pure strategy, we postulate the following second part following from ax-
iomatic observation of ultimate game leadership, where empirical insight
leads to the second part of this postulate. Importantly, implementing a
non-cooperative Stackelberg game, with a very honest and rational leader
results in social optimality for all players (followers), assuming pure strat-
egy across all followers and leader, and that the leader is totally rational,
honest, and is able to achieve a minimum amount of competency in lead-
ing this game, with any finite number of iterations of leading this finite
game.
John Nash stated the following theoremfor non-cooperative games that be-
came widely known as the Nash equilibrium:,
Theorem 1 (Nash Equilibrium) Every game with a finite number of players
and action profiles has at least one Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1951]. A mixed1
strategy always has an equilibrium.2 [Nash, 1951].
We have discovered a postulate as a counter-point to the Nash-Equilibrium
Theorem 1 above. Our postulate is:
∗NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communi-
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1Mixed implies non-deterministic
2i.e., a best response to all others’ best responses, which is not guaranteed for a completely
deterministic, or pure, strategy.
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Postulate 1 (Postulate on Social Optimality for Non-Cooperative Games)
In any game that has any number of players, N , 2 ≤ N ≤ ∞, where each player
has a finite deterministic action profile (i.e., pure strategy), then social op-
timality is potentially achievable, requiring only the following two conditions:
All players are being led by a totally rational and honest leader, resulting in
a unique Stackelberg, [Von Stackelberg, 2010], equilibrium. Then the rational,
honest leader may be able to implement a dynamic game to achieve a fully hi-
erarchical equilibrium, where the action profiles from both leader and followers
are deterministic. Such that assuming competency, honesty and rationality —
social optimality is achievable across all players with a competent and rational
leader, or equivalently, a suitably intelligent, game designer .3
Expanding on Postulate 1, there are a finite to an infinite number of play-
ers which have pure strategies. Due to the players having pure strategies, the
Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed, as stated in Theorem 1. But, however,
we have an empirical observation from a test-case of “global” Stackelberg game
design in transmit radio power control for multiple wireless body area network
(BANs) coexistence, where a hierarchical equilibrium is ensured by the followers
and this was then iterated by the principal game designer to achieve a socially
optimal outcome for the BAN coexistence, despite that all previous theory sug-
gested that this was not possible for any wireless communications network with
power control based on a non-cooperative game [Dong et al., 2015]. I.e., in a
behavioral science context of the game designer, principally J. Dong, provid-
ing competent and intelligent leadership for the followers game of distributed
transmit power control with no central coordination, then social optimality was
postulated empirically from results of implementation.
To obtain Postulate 1, a series of papers were used as tools to solve this prop-
erty. The first paper which sparked this postulate was a non-cooperative trans-
mit power control game [Smith et al., 2014a], which obtained Pareto-efficient
outcomes such as minimized transmit power and rapid convergence to target
packet delivery ratios (PDRs). Next, [Smith et al., 2014a] was simplified for a
standard proposal to the IEEE 802.15 task group 8 [Smith et al., 2014b], which
is currently being considered for the draft 802.15.8 specification . The utility
function from [Smith et al., 2014a] was modified such that it had strict concav-
ity in [Dong et al., 2015] and under all conditions guaranteed a unique Nash
equilibrium. In [Tushar et al., 2012], a Stackelberg game was proposed, show-
ing that infinite number of players can potentially be mapped into four-playing
group types . Finally it can be inferred from [Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2014],
crucially to behavioral sciences, that followers could potentially mapped into
four levels of rationality in games , which if maintained with properly initiated
pure strategy action profiles from the game leader, then We postulate, that in
the general case, social optimality is still achievable.
This is considering a limit of four possible categories of game-theoretic be-
havior: (0) Totally Irrational [Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2014]; (1) More irra-
tional than rational (i.e., somewhat irrational); (2) More rational than irrational
(i.e., Somewhat rational) and (3) Totally rational; that encapsulates all possible
game behaviors for non-rational games.
3This is even if there are any arbitrary number of players demonstrated varying degrees of
irrationality/rationality.
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